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LEGAL TOOLS FOR ACHIEVING
LOW TRAFFIC ZONES
by Amy E. Turner
Amy E. Turner is a senior fellow at the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at
Columbia Law School, where she leads the Cities Climate Law Initiative.

SUMMARY
Cities around the world are looking to reduce greenhouse gas and other emissions from vehicles through
the use of low emission zones and congestion pricing. These strategies have been employed to great success
abroad, including in central London, where both congestion pricing and fees and restrictions on higheremitting vehicles are in effect. In the U.S. law context, these policy approaches give rise to significant legal
issues that have not been well-explored. This Article proposes that these policy approaches be called “Low
Traffic Zones” (LTZs), and surveys those legal considerations. The areas of law explored are: (1) potential
for preemption of LTZ policies by U.S. federal laws; (2) U.S. constitutional considerations; (3) federal tolling
authority; (4) state enabling laws; (5) laws to protect individual privacy and data security; and (6) other
claims that may be raised in litigation. It concludes by outlining guidance U.S. lawmakers and policymakers
may take into account in drafting LTZ policies to comport with U.S. and state law.

A

n increasing number of U.S. cities are seeking to
limit the flow of vehicular traffic in designated areas
as a means to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from cars and trucks and help achieve their municipal climate goals. The creation of these “low traffic zones”
(LTZs) can take a number of different forms, including,
most prominently, (1) bans on one or more categories of
vehicles and (2) fees or tolls that may be charged to all
vehicles equally or made applicable to only certain classes
of vehicles.1
These two policy categories—bans and fees—are often
written about separately, but they are merely two trafficdemand management tools that can be employed to create LTZs, which are defined here as bounded, geographic
areas in which reductions in vehicular traffic are achieved or
attempted through legal and policy approaches, including but
not limited to congestion pricing, low emission zones, and
street closures. In addition to GHG emission reductions,
the reduction of vehicle traffic in cities can produce other
important benefits—such as reducing tailpipe pollution
that can have severe negative public health impacts, miti1.

While both bans and fees can help achieve the goal of reducing traffic and
vehicle emissions, the policies have different strengths: bans offer a city more
control over traffic, while a fee or a toll can help raise funds for city needs,
including further emissions-reducing investments like public transportation, bike- and pedestrian-friendly infrastructure, and electric vehicle charging. See Peter Plastrik & John Cleveland, Game Changers: Bold Actions by Cities to Accelerate Progress Toward Carbon Neutrality
(Michael Shank & Johanna Partin eds., 2018), available at http://carbonneutralcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/CNCA-Game-ChangersReport-2018.pdf.

4-2020

gating traffic congestion, and improving public safety—but
these LTZ policy innovations raise a number of difficult
legal issues in the U.S. law context.
This Article identifies those critical legal questions, provides a comprehensive overview of the state of play, and
offers a range of approaches for lawyers and policymakers
to reach answers appropriate to their own local contexts.
The United States has a complex patchwork of federal,
state, and local laws, and LTZ policies that have found success abroad will need tailoring to comport with U.S. laws.
Part I briefly describes LTZ policy tools and their use in the
United States to date. Part II then explores U.S. federal law
issues associated with LTZs, including preemption of state
and local LTZ laws and policies by federal statutes, constitutional considerations such as the dormant Commerce
Clause, and federal law authority to set and collect tolls in
connection with a congestion pricing program.
Part III discusses municipal authority to implement
LTZ policies and set tolls vis-à-vis applicable state law. In
Part IV, I review legal considerations relating to privacy
and protection of automobile users’ data. Part V contains
a short review of other legal areas in which litigation challenging LTZs may arise. Part VI reviews considerations for
lawmakers and policymakers as they craft LTZ policies to
minimize risk of legal scrutiny. Part VII concludes.
LTZ policies must be developed carefully in collaboration with those expert in traffic and emissions modeling.
The impacts of congestion pricing policies on traffic, GHG
emissions, and vehicle miles traveled (VMT) are complex
and vary by location and circumstances. The vast majority
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of road closures and congestion pricing programs that have
been implemented in the United States over the past two
decades have not been aimed at reducing GHG emissions,
but rather at traffic calming, reducing congestion and travel
times, and developing public space amenities. Depending
on unique local factors, these policies may reduce VMT
(and the emissions associated with them), or may merely
shift trips to different routes or times of day.2 Further, as
Trip Pollard notes in Legal Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in the United States, if congestion pricing or other “revenues are used to build new or expanded roads, the net
result could be to increase VMT.”3
This Article highlights the legal considerations associated
with LTZ policies, leaving the policy, science, economic,
engineering, and urban planning questions to experts in
each of those areas. It is generally accepted that if the goal
of a congestion pricing strategy is to reduce VMT or GHG
emissions, and that if a congestion pricing strategy is to be
progressive and equitable rather than regressive, the fee or
toll should be paired with improvements to public transit
or to bike and pedestrian infrastructure.4

I.

The Range of LTZ Policies

The most well-known LTZs may be London’s low emission zone (LEZ) and ultra low emission zone (ULEZ).
London began congestion pricing in 2003 and has since
expanded the reach of its LEZ and ULEZ in geographic
scope and coverage—as of 2019, the LEZ and ULEZ each
include an extra charge for vehicles that do not meet applicable emission standards.5 While the London model has
not been replicated in the United States, several U.S. cities have implemented or are poised to enact some form of
LTZ strategy, including both bans and fees. Because of the
unique complexities of U.S. federal, state, and local law, it
is infeasible to “copy and paste” London’s LEZ and ULEZ
program into U.S. cities. However, many elements of LTZ
policy are in use in the United States, and the lessons from
those uses can help inform LTZ policies that comport with
and take advantage of U.S. law.
U.S. cities have for years closed commercial areas to
traffic, often to improve bicyclist and pedestrian safety,
to improve the flow of public transportation, or simply as
a retail amenity, rather than as an overt means of reducing GHG pollution. Four blocks of Burlington, Vermont’s
Church Street, known as the Church Street Marketplace,

have been closed to vehicular traffic since 1981.6 More
recently, cities like Los Angeles7 and New York8 have paved
over several street crossings to create “pedestrian plazas”
that “calm traffic and increase safety for people who walk,
bike, and take transit”9 and “transform underused streets
into vibrant, social public spaces.”10 A one-block Jersey
City, New Jersey, pedestrian plaza was laid down in green
paint in 2015; it has since been expanded to two blocks
and the city’s mayor proposes to make the plaza permanent.11 Boston12 and Waltham,13 Massachusetts, are exploring or piloting street closures. In October 2019, the 14th
Street Busway opened in Manhattan with priority bus and
bicycle lanes and a prohibition on nearly all uses of private
(including for-hire) vehicles.14 Most recently, in January
2020, a two-mile stretch of Market Street in San Francisco
was closed to most private vehicles.15
The use of a fee to limit congestion—commonly known
as congestion pricing—has also been used widely along
arterial toll roads and on bridges throughout the United
States since at least the 1990s.16 More recently, cities have
begun exploring cordon pricing, a form of congestion pricing in which vehicles are charged a toll upon crossing
the boundary into a designated geographical zone (often
a central business district or CBD). In 2019, New York
State authorized a cordon pricing regime that will require
all vehicles entering the CBD of New York City (defined
as Manhattan below 60th Street, other than two local
highways) to pay a toll beginning in 2021 or sometime
thereafter. While many have touted the New York City
congestion pricing program as a first, New York City is not
the first U.S. jurisdiction to implement congestion pricing;
it is merely the first to enact a cordon pricing regime.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

2.
3.
4.

5.

Trip Pollard, Transforming Transportation Demand, in Legal Pathways to
Deep Decarbonization in the United States 339 (Michael B. Gerrard
& John C. Dernbach eds., Envtl. L. Inst. 2019).
Id. at 338.
See, e.g., Stuart Cohen & Alan Hoffman, Pricing Roads, Advancing
Equity (2019), available at http://www.transformca.org/sites/default/files/
Pricing_Roads_Advancing_Equity_Combined_FINAL_190314.pdf; Regional Plan Association, Congestion Pricing in NYC: Getting It
Right (2019), available at http://library.rpa.org/pdf/RPA-CongestionPricingNYC_GettingItRight.pdf.
Mayor of London, The Mayor’s Ultra Low Emission Zone for London, https://
www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/environment/pollution-and-air-quality/
mayors-ultra-low-emission-zone-london (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
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14.
15.

16.

Church Street Marketplace, About Us, https://www.churchstmarketplace.
com/about (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
Los Angeles Department of Transportation Livable Streets, Our Projects,
https://ladotlivablestreets.org/projects (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
New York City Department of Transportation, NYC Plaza Program, https://
www1.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/pedestrians/nyc-plaza-program.shtml (last
visited Feb. 14, 2020).
Los Angeles Department of Transportation Livable Streets, People St, https://
ladotlivablestreets.org/programs/people-st (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
New York City Department of Transportation, supra note 8.
City of Jersey City, Newark Avenue Pedestrian Mall, https://www.jerseycitynj.gov/community/transportation/pedestrianmall (last visited Feb. 14,
2020).
Birch Street Plaza in Roslindale to Be Permanently Installed, City of Boston
Mayor’s Off., Sept. 30, 2019, https://www.boston.gov/news/birch-streetplaza-roslindale-be-permanently-installed.
Jenna Fisher, Waltham to Pilot Pedestrian Plaza on Moody Street, Patch,
Sept. 4, 2019, https://patch.com/massachusetts/waltham/waltham-pilotpedestrian-plaza-moody-street.
City of New York, 14th Street Select Bus Service With Transit & Truck Priority
Pilot Project, https://www1.nyc.gov/html/brt/html/routes/14th-street.shtml
(last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
Dana Hull & Laura Bliss, After New York, San Francisco Bans Cars on
Iconic Market Street, Bloomberg, Jan. 29, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2020-01-29/after-new-york-san-francisco-bans-cars-oniconic-market-street.
Orange County, California, opened four variably priced toll lanes on State
Route 91 in 1995, San Diego opened a dynamically priced high-occupancy
toll lane on Interstate 15 in 1998, and in Lee County, Florida, two bridge
tolls were discounted 50% for off-peak use beginning in 1998. See U.S.
Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, Congestion
Pricing: Examples Around the U.S., https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/congestionpricing/resources/examples_us.htm (last modified Oct. 8, 2019).
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In addition to cordon pricing, congestion pricing tools
include variably priced lanes (charging dynamic or variable
tolls—set to rise with congestion—to use separated road
lanes like express toll lanes or high-occupancy toll (HOT)
lanes), variable tolls (charging dynamic or variable toll rates
on all lanes of a road), and areawide charges (per-mile charges
within a cordoned area).17 Another pricing overlay is fleet or
vehicle class pricing, in which a fee is placed on specific types
of vehicles, such as commercial or for-hire vehicles, within a
cordoned zone.18
In addition to its cordon pricing program for all vehicles
set to go into effect in 2021 or thereafter, New York City
implemented a fleet pricing program for for-hire vehicles
traveling through a set geographic zone in 2019,19 and
a Chicago fleet charge on for-hire vehicles in the downtown area went into effect in January 2020.20 Other cities,
including Los Angeles,21 have studied or are considering
cordon pricing schemes as well, and the use of congestion
pricing more generally continues to be used throughout the
country. The pricing of parking spaces has also long been
used as a congestion mitigation strategy, including in areas
of Los Angeles, New York City, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.22

II.

Federal Law Limitations
and Opportunities

Local law, as a subset of state law, interacts with and is limited by federal law, including statutes, the U.S. Constitution, and federal agency policy and regulations. This part
will first discuss the potential for preemption of local LTZ
policies under three federal statutes. It will then address
constitutional considerations, such as the dormant Commerce Clause, that can impact LTZ programs. Finally, this
part will review state and local authority—both opportunities and restrictions—under federal law to set and collect
tolls in connection with a congestion pricing program.
17. Cambridge Systematics, Inc., Tolling and Congestion Pricing Research and Policy Support: Congestion Pricing White Paper 2 (2017),
available at https://www.oregon.gov/ODOT/KOM/Tolling-White-Paper.
pdf.
18. Nelson Nygaard, Seattle Congestion Pricing Study Phase I: Impacts
and Benefits White Paper 12 (2019), available at https://www.seattle.gov/
Documents/Departments/SDOT/About/ImpactsandBenefitsAnalysisWhitePaper_20190518.pdf. Variable pricing for parking can also be considered a
type of congestion pricing. A for-hire vehicle ride fee could—depending on
state and municipal enabling laws—be a way to implement a form of congestion pricing without implementing tolls.
19. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 20, pt. 700 (2019).
20. Chicago, Ill., Ordinance O2019-8527 (Nov. 26, 2019).
21. Matt Tinoco & Blanca Barragan, Congestion Pricing in Los Angeles, Explained,
Curbed L.A., Sept. 27, 2019, https://la.curbed.com/2017/10/13/16467386/
congestion-pricing-los-angeles-explained; Damien Newton, Santa Monica,
Westside Political Leaders Disagree on “Go Zone” Congestion Pricing Proposal,
Streetsblog LA, Mar. 28, 2019, https://la.streetsblog.org/2019/03/28/santa-monica-westside-political-leaders-disagree-on-go-zone-congestion-pricing-proposal/. See also Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Report on the Value Pricing Pilot Program
Through April 2016, at 5-6 [hereinafter Report on VPPP], available at
https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/congestionpricing/value_pricing/pubs_reports/rpttocongress/pdf/vppp16rpt.pdf.
22. U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, Congestion Pricing—Value Pricing Pilot Program Funding, https://ops.fhwa.dot.
gov/congestionpricing/value_pricing/projects/funding.htm (last modified
Oct. 8, 2019).
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A.

Preemption

The Constitution establishes the supremacy of federal
over state law.23 As municipalities are merely political subdivisions of the states in which they are located,24 federal
law can also preempt local law. Depending on how LTZ
laws are written, three federal statutes in particular have
the potential to preempt state or local laws attempting to
establish LTZs: the Clean Air Act (CAA),25 the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), and the Federal
Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA).
Preemption under CAA §209(a), which pertains to
“standard[s] relating to the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,” and EPCA
§32919(a), which pertains to “fuel economy standards or
average fuel economy standards,” are closely related. In
practice, an LTZ law or policy may run afoul of either.
For analytic purposes, however, it is important to treat
each provision on its own terms.

1.

The CAA

Section 209(a) of the CAA states that “no state or political
subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any
standard relating to the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to
this part.”26 However, states, and if authorized by state
law, municipalities, may still “control, regulate, or restrict
the use, operation, or movement of registered or licensed
motor vehicles.”27
The U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on CAA preemption in Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. South Coast
Air Quality Management District (Engine Manufacturers Ass’n I).28 In that case, the South Coast Air Quality
Management District, which has oversight of air pollution controls in greater Los Angeles, had implemented
rules prohibiting public and private fleet operators from
purchasing vehicles that do not meet specified emission
requirements. The question before the Court was whether
the rules could avoid preemption under CAA §209(a)
because they related to the purchase, rather than the sale,
of vehicles. The Court held that they could not: “A command, accompanied by sanctions, that certain purchasers
may buy only vehicles with particular emission characteristics is as much an ‘attempt to enforce’ a ‘standard’
as a command, accompanied by sanctions, that a certain
percentage of a manufacturer’s sales volume must consist
of such vehicles.”29
In contrast, but still relying on Engine Manufacturers Ass’n I, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit later held that a Dallas ordinance that differentiated
between taxi vehicle engine technologies amounted only
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.2; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1923).
42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat. CAA §§101-618.
CAA §209, 42 U.S.C. §7543(a).
CAA §209(d), 42 U.S.C. §7543(d).
541 U.S. 246, 255, 34 ELR 20028 (2004).
Id.
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to an incentive, not a mandate, and therefore it was not
preempted by the CAA. In that case, Association of Taxicab Operators USA v. City of Dallas (Association of Taxicab Operators II),30 a local association of taxi operators
brought suit against the city to challenge an ordinance
that allowed taxi vehicles with compressed natural gas
(CNG) engines to cut to the head of the passenger pickup
line at the municipally owned airport. Adopting language from Engine Manufacturers Ass’n I,31 the Fifth Circuit notes that the Dallas ordinance is not a “command,
accompanied by sanctions,” but rather “an incentive to
encourage cab drivers to transition to CNG technology.”32
In sum, the Dallas ordinance “alters the ‘shopping decisions’ for traditional cab drivers in determining where in
the City to operate . . . [but it does not] effectively compel[ ] a particular course of action.”33
Despite the broad preemptive effects of the CAA, both
statutory and common law have laid out parameters within
which cities are potentially able to act to create a zone
that limits vehicle pollution. For example, CAA §209(d)
states that, despite preemption language, “nothing in this
part shall preclude or deny to any State or political subdivision thereof the right to control, regulate, or restrict
the use, operation, or movement of registered or licensed
motor vehicles.” As the district court further explained in
an earlier procedural stage of Association of Taxicab Operators II (later affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, herein referred
to as Association of Taxicab Operators I), “the longstanding scheme of motor vehicle emissions control has always
permitted the states to adopt in-use regulations—such as
carpool lanes, restrictions on car use in downtown areas,
and programs to control extended idling of vehicles—that
are expressly intended to control emissions.”34
In addition, cities have significant latitude when acting
as direct market participants (i.e., using their own property
or procuring goods or services with their own funds). The
“market participant exception” of the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution, which shields actions by states acting
as market participants from dormant Commerce Clause
violations, has been extended to the statutory law context,
including the CAA. After the Supreme Court remanded
the South Coast Air Quality Management District’s rules
in Engine Manufacturers Ass’n I, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit applied the market participant doctrine to the CAA, noting that “[a]ctions taken by a state or
its subdivision as a market participant are generally protected from federal preemption.”35

30. 720 F.3d 534, 43 ELR 20137 (5th Cir. 2013).
31. Engine Manufacturers Ass’n I, 541 U.S. at 255.
32. Association of Taxicab Operators II, 720 F.3d at 539 (quoting Engine Manufacturers. Ass’n I, 541 U.S. at 255).
33. Id. at 542.
34. Ass’n of Taxicab Operators, USA v. City of Dallas, 866 F. Supp. 2d 595, 599
(N.D. Tex. 2012) (Association of Taxicab Operators I) (quoting Engine Mfrs.
Ass’n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 88 F.3d 1075, 1094, 26 ELR 21477 (D.C. Cir.
1996)).
35. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d 1031,
1040, 37 ELR 20210 (9th Cir. 2007) (Engine Mannufacturers. Ass’n II).
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2.

EPCA

Section 509(a) of the EPCA states that “a State or political subdivision of a State may not adopt or enforce a law
or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy standards for automobiles covered by an
average fuel economy standard under this chapter.”36 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explored the
contours of preemption under EPCA §509(a) in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade v. City of New York (Metropolitan Taxicab II).37 There, New York City had passed a
law that would establish pricing differentials in the maximum lease amount taxicab owners could charge to taxicab
operators based on whether or not a taxicab was a hybrid
or “clean diesel” vehicle. The Second Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction, finding the law was likely preempted
by the EPCA because it amounted to a “de facto mandate
[for the taxicab owners] to purchase hybrid vehicles.”38
Although the terms “fuel efficiency” and “fuel economy”
did not appear in the law, the court explained that the pricing rules “expressly rely on a distinction between hybrid
and non-hybrid vehicles . . . the equivalency of the term
‘hybrid’ with ‘greater fuel efficiency’ . . . is self-evident.”39
The Fifth Circuit later borrowed from this EPCA jurisprudence in considering the CAA question in Association
of Taxicab Operators II. Contrasting the Dallas ordinance
in that case to the facts of Metropolitan Taxicab II, the
court noted that the New York City law was “so coercive
as to indirectly mandate that cab owners purchase hybrids,
‘constitut[ing] an offer which can not, in practical effect,
be refused.’”40 In addition, the court noted that the New
York City taxi law applied in the entire city, while the Dallas ordinance applied only at the city-owned airport.41
The Metropolitan Taxicab II decision squares with two
earlier federal district court cases that also held that the
EPCA preempted state and local mandates requiring fuel
economy or hybrid engines. In the first case, the court
enjoined New York City’s first effort to green the taxi fleet,
which set a minimum mile-per-gallon standard for new
taxis, as likely preempted by the EPCA.42 In the second,
Ophir v. City of Boston, the court held a rule requiring
“[e]very vehicle put into service as a taxi . . . shall be a new
Clean Taxi vehicle or must have been purchased before
August 29, 2008,” to be preempted by the EPCA.43 “Clean
Taxi” vehicles were those on a list that included “only new
hybrid-powered vehicles.”44
This is not to say that all programs targeting taxis are
preempted by the EPCA. In Green Alliance Taxi Cab Ass’n,
36. EPCA §509(a), 49 U.S.C. §32919(a).
37. 615 F.3d 152, 40 ELR 20193 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1264
(2011).
38. Id. at 156.
39. Id. at 157.
40. Association of Taxicab Operators II, 720 F.3d 534, 541, 43 ELR 20137 (5th
Cir. 2013).
41. Id. at 535.
42. Metropolitan Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 7837
(PAC), 2008 WL 4866021 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) (Metropolitan Taxicab I).
43. 647 F. Supp. 2d 86, 88 (D. Mass. 2009).
44. Id.
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Inc. v. King County,45 the court found a “voluntary incentive program” (“small in scope, involving the issuance of
a mere 50 taxicab licenses”) to be not preempted by the
EPCA. Under the Seattle program at issue in that case,
participating taxi licensees had to “agree to utilize hybrid
electric vehicles ‘with a minimum rating of 40 miles per
gallon in the city.’”46 The court, relying on Metropolitan
Taxicab II, noted that the Seattle rule did not require a
“taxicab owner to do anything—they can choose to enter
the program and follow the fuel efficiency rule or refrain
from entering the program and not be bound by the rule.
Plaintiffs have other means of obtaining taxi licenses,
namely purchasing or otherwise transferring them on the
open market.”47 Additionally, municipalities may rely on
a statutory market participant exception to the EPCA for
“automobiles obtained for its own use.”48

3.

The FAAAA

The FAAAA preempts any “State [or local] law, regulation,
or other provision having the force or effect of law related
to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with
respect to the transportation of property.”49 In effect, this
means that cities are limited in the types of direct restrictions they can impose on freight carriers. Thus, the FAAAA
may also preempt local rules relating to LTZs, particularly
where any rules, standards, or restrictions would apply to
the trucking industry. However, legal requirements relating to size or weight of vehicles or highway route controls
are explicitly carved out of the FAAAA.50
In American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,51
the Port of Los Angeles (a division of the city) had introduced a concession agreement for all trucking companies
doing business in the port that required each truck to post
a placard with a phone number for reporting concerns
and for each trucking company to have submitted an offstreet parking plan for its trucks. These requirements were
enforced by a condition—punishable by a fine and up to
six months in prison—that terminal operators not allow
noncompliant trucks into the port. The Supreme Court
held that the concession agreement terms were preempted
by FAAAA §14501(c)(1) because they related to the “price,
route, or service of” motor carriers. The Court further held
that the concession agreement could not be considered
“contract-based participation in a market,”52 because the
concession agreement “functions as part and parcel of a
governmental program wielding coercive power over private parties, backed by the threat of criminal punishment.
That counts as action ‘having the force and effect of law’ if
45.
46.
47.
48.

49.
50.
51.
52.

No. C08-1048RAJ, 2010 WL 2643369 (W.D. Wash. June 29, 2010).
Id. at *2 (quoting Seattle Rule LIC 8-3 §6.4.4 (2007)).
Id. at *5.
EPCA §509(c), 49 U.S.C. §32919(c). See also Metropolitan Taxicab I, No.
08 Civ. 7837 (PAC), 2008 WL 4866021, at *7, 11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31,
2008), in which the market participant exception did not apply to the regulation at issue.
FAAAA §601, 49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(1).
49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(2)(A).
569 U.S. 641, 43 ELR 20128 (2013).
Id. at 649.
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anything does.”53 Other case law looking at FAAAA preemption has less factual similarity to LTZ policies, but still
the law is well established that the FAAAA preempts many
state and local requirements relating to the “price, route, or
service of any motor carrier.”54
As noted above, the FAAAA has a significant carve-out:
the law “shall not restrict . . . the authority of a State to
impose highway route controls or limitations based on the
size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature
of the cargo.”55 This means that municipalities may, subject
to their state-delegated authority, set truck routes, tolls, or
other traffic restrictions based on weight without inviting
FAAAA preemption. This may give municipalities some
flexibility to limit emissions from large trucks in an LTZ
area, provided any requirements comply with these federal
statutes. Municipalities may also generally rely on the market participant exception to the FAAAA’s applicability.56

B.

Constitutional Concerns

In addition to preemption by federal statutes, LTZs can be
impacted by certain U.S. constitutional provisions, such as
the dormant Commerce Clause and, to a lesser extent, the
rights to travel and to equal protection.

1.

Dormant Commerce Clause

The Constitution grants to the federal government the
authority to “regulate commerce . . . among the several
states.”57 Courts have long interpreted this power to include
a “negative” or “dormant” aspect, prohibiting states and
local governments from enacting laws and policies that
discriminate against interstate commerce with “regulatory
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests
by burdening out-of-state competitors.”58 An LTZ policy
that discriminates against interstate commerce rather than
“regulat[ing] evenhandedly with only ‘incidental’ effects
on interstate commerce,59 will be considered ‘virtually per
se invalid.’”60

53. Id. at 650-51.
54. Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008). But see Dan’s
City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 261 (2013), rejecting a claim
that the FAAAA preempted a state law because “for purposes of FAAAA
preemption, it is not sufficient that a state law relates to the ‘price, route, or
service’ of a motor carrier in any capacity; the law must also concern a motor
carrier’s ‘transportation of property’” (internal citations omitted).
55. 49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(2)(A).
56. Tocher v. City of Santa Ana, 219 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000) (market
participant exception did apply to a part of the city’s towing scheme). But
see City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424
(2002).
57. U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
58. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (quoting New Energy
Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1998)).
59. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93,
99, 24 ELR 20674 (1994); see also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617, 624, 8 ELR 20540 (1978).
60. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. at 99. In order to overcome this presumption of invalidity, the state or municipal government will need to overcome strict
scrutiny to show that (1) the law is not related to economic protectionism
and (2) there are no nondiscriminatory alternatives available. Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. at 454; Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
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However, local laws will be sustained where they have
“effects on interstate commerce [that] are only incidental,”
and where the “statute regulates even-handedly . . . [and]
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”61 (This
is referred to as the “Pike balancing test.”) LTZ laws and
policies may have at least an incidental effect on interstate
commerce, as they will likely impact the transportation
of goods and services that flow across state lines (even if
an LTZ itself is located wholly within one state). But LTZ
laws and policies can generally be structured so as to not
facially discriminate against interstate commerce and to
satisfy the Pike test by advancing local goals relating to
traffic reduction, health and safety, and even the reduction
of air emissions.
Cities may also avoid dormant Commerce Clause
restrictions where they are acting as market participants
as opposed to market regulators. Recognizing that there is
“no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of
the States [or municipalities] themselves to operate freely in
the free market,”62 the market participant exception allows
municipalities to use their own property and purchasing
power in ways that affect interstate commerce.63
The dormant Commerce Clause takes on somewhat
increased significance where tolls, congestion pricing, or
some other form of road pricing is used, though congestion pricing is still unlikely to—and can be structured not
to—violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Given the
relative rarity of congestion pricing, particularly outside
the Federal Highway Administration (FHwA) tolling programs, the case law relating to road tolls more generally is
applicable here. Generally, cases alleging dormant Commerce Clause violations arise where different toll amounts
are charged based on state or municipal residency or where
toll discounts are offered to users of a particular toll transponder program.
In Cohen v. Rhode Island, for example, the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island held that a
program discounting bridge tolls for in-state residents did
not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, because plaintiff “failed to identify a specific in-state commercial interest that is favored by the Newport Bridge toll discount
at the expense of particular out-of-state competitors, so
it cannot demonstrate that the discount discriminates
against interstate commerce,”64 and that it further was
“based on a fair approximation of the use of the [bridge]
facilities [and was] not excessive in relation to the benefits
conferred.”65 A toll discount for residents of Staten Island
and the Rockaways in New York City was likewise held
61. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See also United
Haulers Association, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 346, 37 ELR 20097 (2007), which applied the
Pike test.
62. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 447 (1980).
63. See, e.g., White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208
(1983) (“when a state or local government enters the market as a participant
it is not subject to the restraints of the Commerce Clause”).
64. Cohen v. Rhode Island Turnpike & Bridge Auth., 775 F. Supp. 2d 439, 447
(D.R.I. 2011).
65. Id. at 450.
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not to violate the dormant Commerce Clause.66 Federal
courts have also held that providing a toll discount for
users of a certain toll transponder service, such as Fast
Lane or E-ZPass, does not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause.67 Each of these cases relied on the rule set in two
Supreme Court cases opining on the constitutionality of
fees for out-of-state airport users, which apply a threepronged version of the Pike test: “a levy [for out-of-state
residents] is reasonable . . . if it (1) is based on some fair
approximation of the use of the facilities, (2) is not excessive in relation to the benefits conferred, and (3) does not
discriminate against interstate commerce.”68
While basic tolls, and even dynamic road prices that
vary based on congestion, are unlikely to be viewed as violating the dormant Commerce Clause, it is somewhat less
clear whether a claim alleging that differential tolls specifically targeting commercial truck companies (i.e., economic
interests) violates the dormant Commerce Clause would be
successful.69 It also remains to be seen how a congestion
toll, which could be untethered to any “fair approximation of the use of the facilities,”70 might be treated under
this line of case law. (A toll need not be tied to the exact
cost to use the facility; “so long as the toll is based on some
fair approximation of use or privilege for use . . . it will
pass constitutional muster, even though some other formula might reflect more exactly the relative use of the state
facilities by individual users.”71 Though no legal authority
tests this proposition, a congestion toll could seemingly be
viewed as tied to this fair approximation of use if it internalizes the externalities associated with vehicle use.)

2.

Other Constitutional Issues

Petitioners in these cases also allege violations of the constitutional protection to the right to travel, which is not
explicit in the Constitution but has long been protected
by the courts as “a fundamental right protected by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause,”72 and of the right to
equal protection.
Turning first to the right to travel, “state law implicates
the right to travel when it actually deters such travel . . .
when impeding travel is the primary objective . . . or when
66. Janes v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 977 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
67. Yerger v. Mass. Turnpike Auth., 395 Fed. Appx. 878, 885 (3d Cir. 2010);
Angus Partners LLC v. Walder, 52 F. Supp. 3d 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
68. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, Mich., 510 U.S. 355, 369
(1994); Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
405 U.S. 707, 716-17 (1972) (case was later superseded by statute).
69. Robert S. Kirk, Cong. Research Serv., R44910, Tolling U.S. Highways and Bridges 14-16 (2017), available at https://www.ibtta.org/sites/
default/files/documents/2017/CRS%20Interstate%20tolls_2017-08-04.
pdf.
70. Northwest Airlines, 510 U.S. at 369.
71. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport, 405 U.S. at 716-17, quoted in Northwest
Airlines, 510 U.S. at 362-63; Cohen v. Rhode Island Turnpike & Bridge
Auth., 775 F. Supp. 2d 439, 445 (D.R.I. 2011). Note also that the market
participant exception generally does not apply to setting and collecting tolls.
Cohen, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 445; Selevan v. New York Thruway Auth., 584
F.3d 82, 103 (2d Cir. 2009). But see Endsley v. Chicago, 230 F.3d 276, 28486 (7th Cir. 2000).
72. Cohen, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501
(1999)).
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it uses any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.”73 Moreover, “the Supreme Court has
‘always carefully distinguished between bona fide residence requirements, which seek to differentiate between
residents and nonresidents, and residence requirements . . .
which treat established residents differently based on the
time they migrated into the State.’”74 Differential toll rates
based on residency are clearly the former; the Supreme
Court underscores the point by noting that “any person is
free to move to a State and to establish residence there.” 75
These cases generally dispose of the equal protection claims
easily, as they are derivative of the allegations that the tolls
violate the right to travel: “The Equal Protection claim
stands on the same ‘right to travel’ footing as the Privileges
and Immunities claim and fails for the same reasons.”76
Cities and states have long been able to enact tolls on
traffic, pedestrian zones, in-use restrictions on vehicles,
and other legal tools that can advance LTZ objectives
without violating the dormant Commerce Clause or running afoul of other constitutional provisions. They should
be able to similarly develop and implement LTZ laws and
policies, including pricing policies, consistent with constitutional requirements.

C.

Authority to Set Tolls and Implement
Congestion Pricing Under Federal Law

While federal law places limitations on LTZ pricing policies, the FHwA can be very supportive of pricing policies
designed to mitigate congestion. Nearly all of the active
congestion pricing projects in the United States have
been developed with the support of the FHwA, which
began piloting congestion pricing strategies in the 1990s.
These federal projects, which are situated in major metropolitan areas such as Miami,77 San Diego,78 and suburban Virginia,79 are generally variably priced express lanes
on major arterial highways that have higher tolls during
periods of higher traffic congestion. Any project that seeks
to place tolls on federal-aid highways (roads eligible for
FHwA funding, “other than local road[s] or rural minor
collector[s]”)80 will need to comply with U.S.C. Title 23
(Highways). A key question, therefore, is whether a pro73. Id. (quoting Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903
(1986)). “[M]inor burdens impacting interstate travel, such as toll roads, do
not constitute a violation of that right.” Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205
(9th Cir. 1999).
74. Cohen, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (quoting Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 903).
75. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1983); see also Cohen, 775 F.
Supp. 2d at 451. See further discussion in Kirk, supra note 69.
76. Cohen, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 452.
77. Florida Department of Transportation, 95 Express, https://95express.com/
(last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
78. FasTrak, San Diego Region, https://511sd.com/fastrak511sd/I-15ExpLanes
(last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
79. Transurban, Express Lanes, https://www.expresslanes.com/ (last visited Feb.
14, 2020).
80. 23 U.S.C. §101(a)(6) defines a “Federal-aid highway” as “a public highway
eligible for assistance under this chapter other than a highway functionally
classified as a local road or rural minor collector.” “Highway” is a broad
term that includes roads, streets, parkways, rights-of-way, bridges, tunnels,
and more. Id. §101(a)(11). Federal-aid highways comprise approximately
one-quarter of public roads in the United States. Cong. Research Serv.,
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posed LTZ pricing project falls on or encompasses all or
part of any “federal-aid highway.”
The FHwA authorizes congestion pricing through several different programs and statutory provisions. Most significantly, the Value Pricing Pilot Project (VPPP) allows
states and municipalities to study, pilot, or implement
congestion pricing, congestion management, or road pricing strategies, offering federal tolling authority outside the
more limited provisions of 23 U.S.C. §§129 and 166, the
two main statutory provisions permitting tolls on federalaid highways. A wide variety of road pricing strategies are
VPPP-eligible, including cordon pricing,81 the pricing of
parking,82 and areawide charges.83 While 2012 was the last
year in which funding was authorized to support individual VPPP projects, the VPPP continues to offer states and
municipalities the opportunity to obtain federal authorization to implement tolling for road pricing projects; it
also provides technical assistance and advice in connection with such projects.84 Up to 15 states and municipalities may participate in the VPPP at a time—slots rotate as
a city or state steps away. As of November 18, 2019, five
VPPP slots were open.85
FHwA approval of congestion pricing projects, whether
under the VPPP or otherwise, is not guaranteed to come
easily. As of February 2020, the FHwA had not issued its
approval for the New York City congestion pricing program (which includes some federal-aid highways),86 nor
had the U.S. Department of Transportation provided
any guidance as to whether a full environmental impact
statement would be required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)87 or whether a shorter-form
environmental assessment would suffice.88 New York State
Gov. Andrew Cuomo89 and New York City Mayor Bill
de Blasio90 separately suggested that the delay in federal
approval was political; FHwA officials countered that the
state agency had failed to submit all required documen-

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

90.

R44332, Federal-Aid Highway Program (FAHP): In Brief 2 (2019),
available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44332.pdf.
Report on VPPP, supra note 21, at 5-6.
See U.S. Department of Transportation FHwA, Congestion Pricing—Parking
Pricing, https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/congestionpricing/strategies/not_involving_tolls/parking_pricing.htm (last modified Oct. 8, 2019).
See U.S. Department of Transportation FHwA, Congestion Pricing—ZoneBased Pricing, https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/congestionpricing/strategies/involving_tolls/zone_based.htm (last modified Oct. 8, 2019).
Telephone Conversation with Angela Fogle, Staff, FHwA Office of Operations (Nov. 18, 2019).
Id.
Christina Goldbaum & Winnie Hu, Could the Trump Administration Block
Congestion Pricing in New York?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 2020, https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/02/25/nyregion/-trump-congestion-pricing-nyc.html.
42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370h, ELR Stat. NEPA §§2-209.
Dana Rubenstein, Why Congestion Pricing Might Be Delayed, Politico, Feb.
18, 2020, https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2020/02/
14/why-congestion-pricing-might-be-delayed-1261628.
Nolan Hicks & David Meyer, Cuomo Says Trump is Holding Manhattan Congestion Pricing Fees “Hostage,” N.Y. Post, Feb. 20, 2020, https://
nypost.com/2020/02/20/cuomo-says-trump-is-holding-manhattancongestion-pricing-fees-hostage/.
Matt Hickman, Is Trump Holding Up NYC Congestion Pricing and Second
Avenue Subway Funding?, The Architect’s Newspaper, Feb. 25, 2020,
https://archpaper.com/2020/02/trump-blocking-nyc-congestion-pricingand-second-avenue-subway-funding/.
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tation (a charge the agency denied).91 The delay puts the
program’s anticipated January 2021 start date in doubt.92
In addition to the VPPP, grants under 23 U.S.C. §133,
a surface transportation block grant program, can be used
for “projects and strategies designed to support congestion pricing, including electronic toll collection and travel
demand management strategies and programs,”93 and
funds allocated under 23 U.S.C. §149, a congestion mitigation and air quality improvement program, can be used
for congestion mitigation projects and programs in areas
designated nonattainment areas for ozone, carbon monoxide, or particulate matter under §107(d) of the CAA.94
There are significant additional requirements and considerations for each of §§133 and 149, and, in all cases, the
state has the authority to choose which projects receive any
available federal funding,95 so municipalities will need to
work closely with states to pursue any of these options.96
Outside of these special authorizing programs, tolling on federal-aid highways is generally allowed under 23
U.S.C. §129 only upon their construction or reconstruction.97 Interstate highways are further restricted in that any
lanes for which new tolling or pricing is implemented must
add capacity to the road; there may be no reduction in free
lane capacity.98 In addition to these general parameters, the
following Title 23 requirements will need to be considered
in crafting LTZ policies:
•

Highway operators may rely on 23 U.S.C. §166
to convert high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes,
which restrict access to vehicles with two or more
passengers, into HOT lanes, which allow vehicles carrying only the driver to enter the lane in
exchange for a fee, which may be variably priced.99
Section 166 also allows states to permit certain
federally identified alternative fuel vehicles to use
HOV and HOT lanes without meeting the occupancy requirement or paying a toll.100 Buses may be
permitted to use these lanes, potentially expanding
and speeding up public transit services, so long as

91.
92.
93.
94.

Goldbaum & Hu, supra note 86.
Rubenstein, supra note 88.
23 U.S.C. §133(b)(12).
For states that do not have and have never had a nonattainment area, there
is some flexibility for projects under this section to be in areas that are not
nonattainment areas. Id. §149.
95. Id. §145(a).
96. The FHwA also supported four U.S. cities implementing congestion pricing programs (also on arterial roads) under its former Urban Partnership
Agreement Program. While this program is no longer active, resources from
those cities’ experiences are available at U.S. Department of Transportation FHwA, Congestion Pricing—Urban Partnership Agreements, https://
ops.fhwa.dot.gov/congestionpricing/urb_partner_agree.htm (last modified
Oct. 8, 2019).
97. 23 U.S.C. §129. See also 23 U.S.C. §301, which prohibits tolls on federalaid highways other than as authorized by §129.
98. 23 U.S.C. §129. The Interstate System Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
Pilot Program (ISRRPP) offers a slight reprieve to this limitation. Authorized under §1216(b) of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century,
the ISRRPP can authorize up to three interstate highways to implement
tolling programs without maintaining the free lane capacity. As of November 18, 2019, all three slots were open. Telephone Conversation with Angela
Fogle, supra note 84.
99. 23 U.S.C. §166.
100. Id. §166(b)(5).
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•

•

•

all intercity buses are permitted to use the lanes on
the same terms and for the same toll amounts.101
Toll revenues on roads under the FHwA’s jurisdiction must first be used for costs directly attributable to the tolled facility, such as debt service and
a reasonable return on investment for any private
road financers, operation and maintenance costs
for the road, and contractual costs owed under any
public-private partnership agreement.102 Only upon
certification by the relevant public authority that
the highway is adequately maintained may tolling
revenues be used for purposes authorized elsewhere
in Title 23.103
The applicable public authority must submit annual
audit reports demonstrating adequate maintenance
of the highway; failure to comply with this audit
requirement can result in suspension of authority to
collect tolls.104
The state in which the project sits must have a law
permitting tolling.105

Subject to meeting these and other Title 23 requirements, there is no prohibition in §129 or §166 on variable or congestion pricing.106 While public authorities
are not required to enter into any written agreement with
the FHwA in establishing a tolling or congestion pricing
program under §129 or §166, given the audit requirements and potential consequences, the FHwA suggests
that tolling authorities may wish to enter into a memorandum of understanding with the FHwA and provides
suggested terms.107

III. State Law
State law may also serve as an independent restraint on cities looking to create LTZs. In most jurisdictions, municipalities have the authority to regulate or pass laws to
control traffic, though such authority is delegated pursuant
to state- or even municipality-specific laws. Authority to
regulate in order to control traffic may be delegated in a
state constitution, via a municipal home rule statute, or by
another enabling law. Congestion pricing requires separate
legal authority from a state—the authority to set and col101. Id. §166(b)(4)(C)(iii).
102. Id. §129(a)(3)(A).
103. These purposes may include public transportation assets such as bus infrastructure, HOV lanes, parking, and electric vehicle charging (23 U.S.C.
§142(a)(1)); carpool and vanpool projects (23 U.S.C. §146(a)); and “pedestrian walkways and bicycle transportation facilities” (23 U.S.C. §217(a)).
Each of these uses is subject to the approval of the FHwA and significant
other requirements.
104. 23 U.S.C. §129(c).
105. Id. §129(a)(8).
106. The FHwA does not provide requirements with respect to setting toll rates,
other than that intercity buses must pay the same rates for HOV lane access
as public transportation buses and that public authorities must consult with
applicable metropolitan planning organizations in connection with HOV
facilities. Robert S. Kirk, Cong. Research Serv., R43575, Tolling U.S.
Highways 11 (2016) (referencing 23 U.S.C. §§166(b)(3)(C) and (g)),
available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43575.pdf.
107. U.S. Department of Transportation FHwA, Tolling Memorandum of Understanding Sample Template, https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/tolling_and_pricing/tolling_pricing/sample_mou_template.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
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lect tolls. This part will discuss generally the ways in which
municipalities are authorized to enact laws or policies to
control traffic and the limits of that authorization.

A.

Interplay With State Law—Varies by State

Municipalities often have broad powers to regulate street
traffic consistent with state law. In particular, “elimination of congestion and hazards to life and property and
the safety and convenience of the traveling public constitute a vital part of the police power of municipalities.”108
States have delegated this authority in different ways.109
For LTZ strategies that do not involve a toll or fee,
municipal authority to close roads to vehicular traffic as
a part of the delegated authority to regulate traffic is relatively well established.
An Idaho court determined that the city of Pocatello
acted within its authority in opening up a street only to
bicycle and pedestrian traffic.110 In Connecticut, a court
found the city of Hartford’s closure to vehicle traffic of a
one-block stretch of road in the downtown area during
certain hours of the day to be “intended both to improve
the city’s economic well-being and to ensure the safety of
persons patronizing downtown business establishments . . .
represent[ing] a legitimate use of the city’s police power to
advance economic, aesthetic and safety-related goals.”111
Some cities will also be able to set size and weight restrictions (which can serve as an imperfect proxy for emissions)
for local roads.112 Cities often may also regulate parking
and use of curb space on city streets, as in California, where
California Vehicle Code §22507(a) allows local authorities
to “prohibit or restrict the stopping, parking, or standing
of vehicles.”113
This is not to say that municipal attempts to close roads
are always met with court approval. In very general terms,
courts charged with reviewing municipal traffic regulations look to see if traffic regulations are reasonable and
applied uniformly. In Ohio, for example, a traffic regulation (as an exercise of police power) “is valid if it bears
a real and substantial relationship to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare, and if it is not unreasonable or arbitrary.”114 A city generally may not treat its own
108. 7A McQuillin Municipal Corporations §24:633 (3d ed. 2019).
109. For example, municipalities in Missouri have “the authority to exercise . . .
police power in making ‘additional rules of the road or traffic regulations to
meet their needs and traffic conditions’ as long as the ordinance’s provisions
are consistent with and do not conflict with state law.” Ballard v. City of
Creve Coeur, 419 S.W.3d 109, 119 (Mo. Ct. Apps. 2013). With respect
to New York City, the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law supersedes
conflicting local requirements. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §1640 (2008). A
state may have concurrent jurisdiction with respect to traffic laws. City of
Cedar Rapids v. State, 478 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Iowa 1991). In Ohio, “a
city’s authority to regulate traffic comes from the Constitution.” Cleveland
v. Martinez, 126 Ohio Misc. 2d 36, 39 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 2003).
110. Christensen v. City of Pocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 139 (Idaho 2005).
111. Cohen v. City of Hartford, 244 Conn. 206, 219 (Conn. 1998).
112. See Corona Ready Mix, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles Traffic Violations Appeals Bd., 226 A.D.2d 630 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); State ex rel.
Dean v. City Court of City of Tucson, 123 Ariz. 189, 192 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1979).
113. Homes on Wheels v. City of Santa Barbara, 119 Cal. App. 4th 1173, 1178
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
114. Martinez, 126 Ohio Misc. 2d at 39.
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residents significantly more favorably than nonresident
drivers, as with a program that “exempted” residents from
restrictions,115 but differential toll rates based on residency
are generally permissible. Ordinances will often be held
invalid if there is no alternate route available to the vehicles that have been blocked by a closure to vehicle traffic
or some other traffic-limiting regulation.116 Specific state
laws and fact patterns may yield additional restrictions; for
example, a California court held that Santa Barbara was
not preempted by state law from restricting parking, but
that the city had not complied with state law in providing
sufficient notice of a parking restriction.117 The process followed by a city in closing a road could also be found to run
afoul of the state enabling law.118

B.

Authority to Implement Tolls

State law may be more limiting where a city wishes to create an LTZ that requires drivers to pay a tax, toll, or fee
(i.e., congestion pricing). For LTZ or congestion pricing
projects that are not placed on federal-aid highways, state
law controls a municipality’s ability to implement and collect tolls.119 Legislation varies from state to state. Common
elements of many state road tolling laws include, among
others, clarifications on the delegated police power, “constraints on the use of [tolling revenue] funds,” and “relationships with other entities.”120
For example, Oregon state law generally allows cities
and counties to collect tolls on roads that they manage.121
However, the use of revenues from such tolls is limited to
“construction, reconstruction, improvement, repair, maintenance, operation and use of public highways, roads,
streets and roadside areas in” Oregon.122 In New York
State, by contrast, the Vehicle and Traffic Law reserves tollsetting authority for the state123; New York City, in enacting its cordon pricing scheme, had to go through the state
legislature to pass enabling legislation. The state and local
responsibilities for implementing New York’s congestion
pricing program are further delineated by a memorandum
of understanding between the state-controlled Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, which has most of the
authority, and the New York City Department of Trans115. City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, 91 Cal. App. 3d 749 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979). See also People of the State of New York v. Grant, 306 N.Y. 258
(N.Y. 1954).
116. See, e.g., Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Town of Hebron, 295 Conn. 802,
818-19 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2010) (town’s closure of a road that was the only
means of access to a planned subdivision found “inconsistent with the statutes governing the review of subdivision applications”); but see McCammon
v. City of Redwood City, 149 Cal. App. 2d 421 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957)
(upholding weight restriction on trucks over three tons that effectively required large trucks to use a different, longer route to a quarry).
117. Homes on Wheels, 119 Cal. App. 4th at 1175.
118. See Zack’s, Inc. v. City of Sausalito, 165 Cal. App. 4th 1163, 1183-84 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2008).
119. 23 U.S.C. §§129(a)(8), 166(c)(1).
120. U.S. Department of Transportation FHwA, Office of Highway Policy Information—Toll Facilities in the United States, https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/tollpage/2015/history.cfm (last modified Apr. 11, 2018).
121. Or. Rev. Stat. §383.004(2) (2007).
122. Or. Const. art. IX, §3a.
123. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §1630 (2019).
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portation.124 Washington State takes a different approach,
with state law authorizing the creation of “transportation
benefit districts” that have the authority “to charge vehicles
tolls within the boundaries of the district” so long as such
tolls are approved by “a majority of the votes in the district
voting on a proposition at a general or special election.”125
The Seattle Transportation Benefit District was established
under this authorizing law in 2010.126
The restriction in Oregon (and other states, such as North
Carolina127 and Washington128) on use of tolling revenues
is important. A range of policymakers recommend that
congestion pricing policies be paired with investments in
transit, bicycle, and pedestrian improvements, which can
help further reduce vehicle emissions and mitigate equity
concerns stemming from increased commuting costs for
low- and middle-income communities.129 Ideally, these
could be funded by the revenues from congestion tolling.
In jurisdictions where use of tolling revenues is restricted,
policymakers should seek other ways to fund these types
of improvements, and should, if possible, avoid using such
funding to increase vehicle capacity on the tolled or other
roads, which could lead to an increase in VMT.130 There’s
a credible argument that bicycle, pedestrian, and busway
improvements could fall within the permissible scope of
“highways, roads, streets and roadside areas.”

IV. Privacy
LTZs can give rise to significant privacy concerns where
they monitor vehicles via camera or collect payment
through some form of in-car technology, as many congestion pricing programs do. There are three broad, potentially complementary ways in which privacy and data
security are implicated in monitoring vehicles in connection with LTZ boundaries and collecting payments for
congestion pricing systems: (1) Cameras are often used to
monitor both tolled arterial roads and the boundaries of
cordon zones, and to identify by license plate vehicles that
do not have an on-board payment mechanism (a system
known as automatic license plate readers or ALPRs). Such
license plate information might, subject to applicable law,
be stored in databases and shared with other parties.131
(2) On-board payment mechanisms must have some way to
track when the vehicle crosses the cordon or toll point, and,
for areawide charges, must be able to track the mileage of
the vehicle within the zone. (3) A municipality may also
124. See Michael B. Gerrard & Edward McTiernan, New York’s New Congestion Pricing Law, N.Y. L.J., May 8, 2019, https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/2019/05/08/new-yorks-new-congestion-pricing-law/.
125. Seattle Department of Transportation, Seattle Congestion Pricing Study: Phase I Summary Report 27 (2019) (referencing Wash. Rev.
Code §36.73.020 (2010)), available at https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/SDOT/About/SeattleCongestionPricingStudy_SummaryReport_20190520.pdf.
126. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 123397 (Sept. 20, 2010).
127. N.C. Gen. Stat. §136-89.188 (2018).
128. Wash. Rev. Code §47.56.830(3) (2008).
129. See, e.g., Cohen & Hoffman, supra note 4.
130. Pollard, supra note 2.
131. Robin Chase, The Technology That Could Transform Congestion Pricing,
CityLab, May 8, 2019, https://www.citylab.com/perspective/2019/05/
congestion-pricing-technology-apps-road-tolls-data-privacy/589006/.
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collect data from for-hire vehicle companies to “improve
assessment of impacts on VMT, GHG emissions, and transit, to adopt policies . . . that lower subsidies for driving and
send price signals that better reflect the cost of driving to
help reduce emissions.”132 Data privacy is a rapidly evolving
area, as experts and policymakers are continually assessing
new risks and responses.133

A.

ALPRs

A patchwork of state laws governs traffic cameras. States
with few or no toll roads may not have considered whether
to allow toll enforcement cameras. Moreover, several
states have enacted laws that govern the data collected by
ALPRs.134 Such laws restrict who may access ALPR data
and for what purpose, and specify the maximum amount
of time such data may be stored before it is required to be
destroyed. Privacy advocates and others have raised concerns that ALPR cameras can be used to track the movements of individuals, and that records from these cameras
have “been used and criticized for their use in tracking
immigrants, welfare recipients, Muslims, as well as used in
divorce courts.”135 The American Civil Liberties Union and
its state counterparts, in particular, have sought to highlight these concerns.136
In Neal v. Fairfax County Police Department, the Virginia Supreme Court held that “the pictures and data associated with each license plate number constitute ‘personal
information’ as defined by” Virginia state law.137 The court
132. Pollard, supra note 2, at 341.
133. See, e.g., Lauren Feiner, A Federal Privacy Law Is Starting to Crystallize, but
Democrats and Republicans Can’t Agree on How to Do It, CNBC, Dec. 4,
2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/04/a-federal-privacy-law-is-startingto-crystallize-senators-remain-divided-over-details.html; Allison Grande,
Wash. Could Be Next to Enact Consumer Data Privacy Law, Law360, Jan.
13, 2020, https://www.law360.com/articles/1233674/wash-could-be-nextto-enact-consumer-data-privacy-law.
134. See, e.g., Ark. Code §§12-12-1801 to -1808 (2013); Cal. Veh. Code
§2413 (2011) and Cal. Civ. Code §§1798.29 (2020), 1798.90.5 (2016);
Colo. Rev. Stat. §24-72-113 (2014); Fla. Stat. §316.0777 (2019);
Ga. Code §35-1-22 (2018); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 29-A, §2117-A(2)
(2019); Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety §3-509 (2019); Minn. Stat.
§§13.82, 13.824, 626.8472 (2015); Mont. Code Ann. §§46-5-117 to
-119 (2017); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§60-3201 to -3209 (2018); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§261.75-b (2016), 236.130 (2014); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§20-183.30
to .32 (2015); Tenn. Code §55-10-302 (2014); Utah Code Ann. §§416a-2001 to -2005 (2018); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, §§1607, 1608 (2018).
Aggregated by Automated License Plate Readers: State Statutes, Nat’l Conf.
St. Legislatures, Mar. 15, 2019, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-statutes-regulating-the-useof-automated-license-plate-readers-alpr-or-alpr-data.aspx.
135. Chase, supra note 131 (citing Tanvi Misra, When Transit Agencies Spy on
Riders, CityLab, Sept. 18, 2018, https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/09/
when-your-transit-agency-is-found-tracking-you/570292/); Sidney Fussell,
California Officials Admit to Using License Plate Readers to Monitor Welfare
Recipients, Gizmodo, Aug. 13, 2018, https://gizmodo.com/california-officials-admit-to-using-license-plate-reade-1828313821; Paul Lewis, CCTV
Aimed at Muslim Areas in Birmingham to Be Dismantled, Guardian, Oct.
25, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/25/birminghamcctv-muslim-areas-surveillance; Chris Newmarker, E-ZPass Records Out
Cheaters in Divorce Court, NBCNews.com, Aug. 10, 2017, http://www.
nbcnews.com/id/20216302/ns/technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/
t/e-zpass-records-out-cheaters-divorce-court/#.XdapuVdKiUk.
136. See American Civil Liberties Union, Automatic License Plate Readers Search
Results Page, https://www.aclu.org/search/%20?f%5b0%5d=field_issues%3
A106&f%5b1%5d=type%3Ablog (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
137. 295 Va. 334, 346 (Va. 2018).

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

4-2020

Copyright © 2020 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

remanded Neal to the trial court, which determined that the
police department’s “passive use” practices with respect to
ALPR data was in violation of Virginia’s Government Data
Collection and Dissemination Practices Act.138 In another
case—one related to disclosure of information rather than
permissibility of using ALPR data—a New York court
ruled that ALPR data relating to a person or license plate
should not be disclosed to a third party, because while one
“read” of a license plate did not implicate a person’s privacy
interests, the “accumulated data [of many reads] can create a non-contextual ‘mosaic’ which is essentially a highresolution image of an individual, defined by his or her
vehicle’s randomly recorded movements and locations.”139
In addition to laws relating to ALPR data specifically,
more general state data privacy laws may limit how long
and for what purpose private data can be kept, used, or
shared. Among the most comprehensive state data privacy
laws is California’s Consumer Privacy Act, which went into
effect in January 2020 and which specifies a variety of protections for the handling of private data.140 Other states
are following suit with data privacy protections as well; the
particulars vary from state to state and practitioners should
pay careful attention to state data privacy requirements as
they become law. Any retention of license plate data relating to toll or congestion fee enforcement will need to comply with these laws.
Privacy considerations around on-board payment
mechanisms are relatively more settled, though they can
present risk. Toll-monitoring transponders, such as those
used in systems such as E-ZPass (eastern and midwestern
United States), I-PASS (Illinois), SunPass (Florida), and
NTTA (Texas) have long been accepted as appropriate
for efficient and cost-effective road tolling systems. As the
FHwA noted:
Tolling agencies have devised a method to protect the
public’s privacy by linking the transponder and the driver’s personal information with a generic, internal account
number that does not reveal the driver’s identity and is not
disclosed to other organizations. Also, a motorist can open
an anonymous account if he or she so chooses.141

Still, cities will need to make sure that contractors can
handle compliance with state privacy laws and can protect
themselves from breach.

138. Va. Code §§2.2-3800 et seq. (2018).
139. Gannett Co., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 47 Misc. 3d 898, 905 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2015). There is also significant case law relating to whether, and in what
circumstances, use of ALPR data may constitute a Fourth Amendment
search under the Constitution and pertaining to other questions about the
use of such data. This line of inquiry is omitted here, as it does not directly
relate to developing LTZ or congestion pricing policies.
140. A.B. 375, 2017-2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018).
141. FHwA, U.S. Department of Transportation, Congestion Pricing: A
Primer 9 (2006), available at https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/congestionpricing/congestionpricing.pdf.
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B.

Areawide Charges

While best practices around these basic transponders are
well established, systems to measure areawide charges
(which are per-mile fees within a cordon zone) require more
user information and therefore could give rise to additional
privacy concerns, particularly where they use global positioning satellite (GPS) tracking in real time.142 In addition
to state requirements, federal funding programs for piloting road user charges require the applicable technologies
to protect user privacy.143 Some have proposed employing
private companies to manage such data via a transponder
or smartphone application, allowing the mileage and payment data to be transmitted in encrypted format without
sharing where the car has been.
Washington State recently piloted a road user charge
system; a task force studying the pilot made recommendations to protect user privacy including offering a range
of mileage reporting options, from those that required no
GPS data (which were more protective of privacy but billed
drivers for miles driven outside of the state) and those that
relied on GPS trackers (which were less protective of privacy but more convenient and did not bill users for miles
driven out of state).144 These approaches to location and
payment privacy could be used for cordon or areawide
charges as well. Other recommendations to come out
of Washington’s pilot program were for Washington to
update its list of statutory exemptions to its public records
disclosure law145 so that mileage data is considered private
information,146 and the adoption of a model privacy policy
for road usage charging.147
California,148 Colorado,149 and Oregon150 also piloted
road user charges as a replacement for gasoline taxes, and
similarly grappled with the tension between ease of mileage reporting and user privacy.151 (As in Washington, these
142. See, e.g., Benjamin K. Orr & Alice M. Rivlin, Brookings, RoadUse Pricing: How Would You Like to Spend Less Time in Traffic? (2009), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/0625_transportation_rivlin.pdf.
143. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, §6020(d)
(1)(B), 129 Stat. 1582 (2015).
144. Washington State Road Usage Charge Steering Committee, Steering Committee Report for the WA RUC Pilot Project 22 (2019),
available at https://waroadusagecharge.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/
WA-RUC_Final-Report.pdf.
145. Wash. Rev. Code §42.56.010(3) (2017).
146. Washington State Road Usage Charge Steering Committee, supra
note 144, at 125-26.
147. Id. at 126-27 and app. A-6, at 33, available at https://waroadusagecharge.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/11/WA-RUC-SC-Report-Appendices2019_10_
COMPILED.pdf.
148. California State Transportation Agency & Caltrans, California
Road Charge Pilot Program: Summary Report (2017) (authorized
by Cal. S.B. 1077), available at https://dot.ca.gov/-/media/dot-media/district-12/documents/summary-a11y.pdf.
149. Colorado Department of Transportation, Colorado Road Usage
Program Final Report (2017) (No. CDOT-2017-11), available at https://
www.codot.gov/programs/ruc/programs/ruc/documents/rucpp-final-report.
150. Oregon Department of Transportation, Oregon’s Road Usage
Charge: The OReGO Program Final Report (2017) (authorized by Or.
H.B. 2017), available at https://www.oregon.gov/ODOT/Programs/RUF/
IP-Road%20Usage%20Evaluation%20Book%20WEB_4-26.pdf.
151. Road Use Charges (RUC): News From the States, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures, Apr. 24, 2018, http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/roaduse-charges.aspx.
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pilots assessed the use of road user charging to replace gasoline taxes, but the privacy considerations are the same as they
would be for an areawide charge or other mileage-based fee
or toll.) In particular, the Colorado study noted, after review
of several other road pricing pilots and studies, that
one effective way to address privacy concerns is to allow
users to select the mileage reporting option they are
most comfortable with. Those with significant privacy
concerns can select a low-technology mileage reporting
option such as odometer reporting, while those that are
more comfortable with technology can select the GPS
enabled mileage option.152

With any approach, municipalities should pay close attention to legal requirements relating to user data and its management, regardless of whether the data are handled by a
private or governmental entity. A breach of data security
could give rise to significant legal claims even where such
requirements are closely followed.

C.

For-Hire Vehicle Data

Municipalities ask for-hire vehicle companies (also referred
to as transportation network companies or TNCs) to provide trip data for a variety of reasons, including so the
municipality can better assess TNC activity in a cordon
zone (this last form of data is relevant where cities have
implemented or are considering implementing fleet pricing
for for-hire vehicles within a cordon zone, as New York
City and Chicago have done). In collecting any type of
personal or user data from TNCs, cities should take care to
comply with federal, state, and local data security requirements. Moreover, even where data collection policies have
been appropriately crafted, for-hire vehicle companies may
claim that they are not required to turn over such data or
may file suit against the municipality in an attempt to prevent disclosure of the information.153 Whether a municipality succeeds on the merits of such a suit would depend
on applicable facts and law, but municipalities may wish
to consider the risks of this type of litigation with for-hire
vehicle companies in developing data disclosure policies.

V.

The Litigation Grab Bag

Of course, a city’s authority to regulate traffic does not preclude potential litigation aimed at preventing implementation of changes to traffic patterns. Affected neighbors or
others may look for legal hooks upon which to challenge
proposed changes to on-street traffic. Several of the cases
discussed herein began as complaints by residents or drivers
concerned about impacts to their ability to drive or about
152. Colorado Department of Transportation, supra note 149, at 18.
153. See, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Uber Techs., Inc., 36 Cal. App.
5th 66, 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019); Lyft, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 190 Wash. 2d
769 (Wash. 2018); Rasier, LLC v. New Orleans, 222 So. 3d 806, 813 (La.
Ct. App. 2017); City of Columbus v. Lyft, Inc., 22 N.E.3d 304 (Franklin
County Mun. Ct. 2014); Carniol v. N.Y. City Taxi & Limousine Comm’n,
42 Misc. 3d 199, 209 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013).
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increased or decreased traffic near their homes or businesses.154 In many of these cases, the law allowing municipalities to set traffic patterns is fairly well settled, but cities
and towns looking to close roads or limit traffic should be
sure to craft their policies to avoid federal preemption and
comply with state enabling laws in order to minimize the
burden of fending off any legal attacks. Other legal issues
that may arise in litigation include:
• Takings. There are an extensive number of cases considering the question of whether road closures constitute compensable takings; a discussion of that case
law and survey of the outcomes are beyond the scope
of this Article, but cities should take care to avoid any
such result.
• Environmental review statutes. Block associations
and residents surrounding 14th Street in Manhattan
joined together to challenge the 14th Street Busway,
which prohibits most uses of private cars in favor of
priority bus lanes. These neighboring block associations and residents alleged that the review process required by state and local environmental review statutes had been insufficient (while the case remains
open, no court has determined this to be the case).155
Implementation of the busway, which had been
scheduled to open in July 2019, was enjoined by the
courts twice before finally going into effect.
• Fleet pricing (i.e., a surcharge on taxi and other
for-hire vehicle rides). A group of taxicab owners,
operators, and fleet managers brought suit against
New York State and the New York City Taxi & Limousine Commission in connection with a surcharge
on for-hire vehicle rides in much of Manhattan, alleging violations of substantive due process under
both the U.S. and New York State Constitutions and
the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, among other allegations.156 The court rejected
petitioners’ claims.157 A one-month stay during the
pending litigation cost the state an estimated $1 million per day, money that would have gone to fund
public transit.158
154. See, e.g., Christensen v. City of Pocatello, 142 Idaho 132 (Idaho 2005).
155. Council of Chelsea Block Ass’ns v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Transp., No.
156153/19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 20, 2019); 14th St. Coalition v. City of
N.Y. Dep’t of Transp., No. 159030/18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 28, 2018).
156. Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Order to Show Cause Seeking Preliminary Injunction, Taxifleet Mgmt. LLC v. State, No. 161920/18
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 16, 2019).
157. Decision/Judgment at 10, Taxifleet Mgmt. LLC v. State, No. 161920/18
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 25, 2019).
158. Respondent State of N.Y.’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and in Support of the State’s
Cross-Motion to Dismiss the Verified Petition at 2, Taxifleet Mgmt. LLC v.
State, No. 161920/18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
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VI. Considerations in Crafting
LTZ Laws and Policies
In crafting LTZ policies, cities will need to consider federal
preemption and comportment with federal and state law,
as well as the particular privacy concerns inherent to LTZ
and congestion pricing programs. LTZ laws and policies
that take into account the legal issues identified above are
those that:
• Do not set any form of “standard relating to the control
of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines,” or “fuel economy standards or average fuel economy standards for automobiles” to avoid
preemption under CAA §209(a) or EPCA §32919(a),
respectively. Note that reference to low emissions automobile technologies, such as hybrids or electric vehicles, may be considered proxies for fuel economy standards, per Metropolitan Taxicab II. In this respect, bans
or fees on all vehicle traffic, or all vehicle traffic other
than public transport and/or commercial deliveries,
may be less likely to be preempted than those that ban
or set a toll for only some traffic based on emissions or
fuel economy, or a proxy thereof.
o Where referencing emissions or fuel economy
standards, or distinguishing between internal
combustion engine and low emissions vehicle
technologies, provide incentives for using low
emissions technology rather than mandating
their use. Note that incentives should not
be “so coercive as to indirectly [constitute a]
mandate.”159 Incentives might include access
to priority lanes, parking, charging, or loading zones.
o In the congestion or road pricing context, the
courts have not yet weighed in on toll, fee, or
pricing differentials set according to emissions
or fuel economy standards. It is therefore not
clear what, if any, pricing differential would
be considered by a court to be an incentive as
opposed to a de facto mandate.
• Set in-use restrictions for vehicles, which are permitted by CAA §209(d) and which can have a variety
of benefits, including limiting traffic or speeding up
slow-moving traffic, improving public safety, and
limiting emissions. Such in-use restrictions might
include the “carpool lanes, restrictions on car use in
downtown areas, and programs to control extended
159. Association of Taxicab Operators II, 720 F.3d 534, 541, 43 ELR 20137 (5th
Cir. 2013).

4-2020

idling of vehicles” identified in Association of Taxicab
Operators II, as well as parking, stopping, and standing rules and use of curbside space. In particular, 23
U.S.C. §166 provides explicitly for certain alternative fuel vehicles to be granted access to HOV lanes
on federal-aid highways.160
• Avoid regulating the “price, route, or service of any
motor carrier” in a way that would invite preemption concerns under the FAAAA. Size or weight
restrictions on vehicles (which can serve as an imperfect proxy for vehicle emissions) and programs
setting truck routes are generally not preempted by
the FAAAA.161
• Consider carefully the contours of the dormant
Commerce Clause. Laws or policies that are discriminatory or that favor drivers from one state
over another will invite state law and Commerce
Clause scrutiny, though cities retain some authority
to enact laws aimed at improving safety or reducing congestion, even if they have some impact on
interstate commerce.
• Emphasize the local benefits that are appropriate exercises of the municipal police power, which include
traffic reduction, public health and safety, and aesthetic and economic concerns, rather than the GHG
emission reductions attributable to vehicles. Naming
LTZs or LTZ policies with reference to these benefits
may also be helpful, though not controlling, in avoiding federal scrutiny. (Examples include “low traffic
zone,” “congestion zone,” “pedestrian zone,” “busway,” or other phrasing that emphasizes benefits to
the flow of traffic or pedestrian and bicyclist safety.)
• Leverage the city’s role as a market participant, which
acts as an exception to both the Commerce Clause
and preemption under federal statutes. A city is permitted to favor low emissions technology where it is
procuring goods or services for itself.
• Where assessing a congestion price or other toll or
fee, are appropriately authorized by applicable federal
and state tolling laws. Federal law places significant restrictions on tolling on federal-aid highways, but the
FHwA and the federal VPPP may also offer useful assistance and latitude for LTZ pricing strategies. State
enabling laws vary and may require municipalities to
work with the state-level government in enacting a
congestion pricing regime. Close attention should also
be paid to the allowable uses of tolling revenues.
160. 23 U.S.C. §166(b)(5)(A).
161. 49 U.S.C. §14501(a)(2).
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• Are protective of individual privacy to the extent required by federal, state, and local law and exercise
due care with respect to vehicle and payment data
(including any data handled by private contractors).
Where vehicle operators are required to make payments, as in congestion pricing programs, offering
options that require varying amounts of user information can allow motorists to choose the option that
meets their level of privacy concern.
• Where these recommendations are infeasible, pricing
parking, offering incentives like vehicle charging, and
greening the city’s own municipal fleet can be useful
policy tools to reduce vehicle emissions.
• Otherwise comport with individual state law and
municipal enabling statutes to minimize the risk of
additional litigation.

VII. Conclusion
Local governments have significant tools available to them
in crafting LTZ policies. While some approaches implemented abroad are not feasible in the U.S. legal context,
and while appropriate strategies will vary from place to
place in the United States for a variety of reasons, including legal ones, cities wield considerable authority to control
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traffic within their borders, subject to state law. Moreover,
working with states and the federal government, municipalities can use pricing strategies—on all vehicles, on forhire vehicles, or on parking—to reduce traffic congestion.
Federal preemption is a significant concern, particularly
where fuel economy or fuel efficiency, emissions control
standards, or vehicle emissions technology are implicated,
but it does not stand in the way of crafting LTZ policy that
does not run afoul of these standards or structures them as
true incentives.
LTZs can provide a range of benefits to a city or local
area. The policy focus here is on GHG emission reductions,
but as in much of climate policy, the co-benefits are numerous. It is in the pursuit of these ancillary benefits—traffic
and congestion mitigation; protection of health and safety;
improved local air quality; development of pedestrian,
bike, and commercial amenities—that municipalities can
exercise significant police powers. LTZ strategies involving
road closures, limits on traffic, road and congestion pricing, and other policies can address a range of these benefits, including (under the guidance of an expert in GHG
emissions modeling) GHG emissions. Cities are increasingly looking for options to mitigate traffic or eliminate it
altogether in certain geographic areas. With careful drafting to accommodate federal and state considerations, LTZ
strategies can help accomplish these goals, and in so doing
can help cities make significant progress in achieving their
carbon mitigation targets.
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